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Abstract
The few economically motivated papers on attitudes towards migration interprets
results within models of labour market competition. Concerns about the welfare system
may however be an additional factor to fuel hostility towards immigrants if they are
considered to be competitors for these resources. Hostility towards immigration may
also have racial motives that are unrelated to any economic considerations. We try to
separate racial and economic components to attitudes towards immigration. Our analysis
is based on the British Social Attitudes Survey, which includes questions on attitudes
towards immigration from di®erent minority groups, as well as attitudes towards related
concerns, like job security and bene¯t expenditures. Based on this unusually rich data
source, we relate preferences towards immigration to the three factors by specifying and
estimating a multiple factor model. Our results suggest that racial issues are considerably
more important than economic concerns in driving attitudes, and particularly so amongst
less educated and lower skilled sections of the population. We do not ¯nd strong evidence
for the hypothesis that labour market concerns among manual and unskilled workers lead
to opposition towards further immigration.
¤We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Joseph Altonji, George Borjas, David Card,
Edward Glaeser, Timothy Hatton, Hidehiko Ichimura, Zig Layton-Henry, Albert Satorra, Christoph
Schmidt, and Frank Windmeijer.
yUniversity College London, Centre for Research and Analysis on Migration (CReAM), and Insti-
tute for Fiscal Studies. Email: c.dustmann@ucl.ac.uk; i.preston@ucl.ac.uk.
21 Introduction
The debate on immigration features highly on the political agenda both in Europe and
in the US. Regulations concerning immigration are frequently adjusted to changes in the
economic situation, and re-designed so as to accommodate shifts in general attitudes
of the public towards immigration. The economic consequences of immigration for the
native population, the perceived e®ects on cultural identity and social cohesion, and
the strong feelings involved make this a topic which ¯gures prominently in electoral
campaigns. To understand what drives individual preferences over immigration policies
is therefore an important research area, both for descriptive political economy and for
policy design.
The way in which individuals from the native population perceive the e®ects of
immigration on the labour market is likely to be one prime candidate for in°uencing
preferences over further migration. The process which forms preferences may relate
to basic intuitions about labour market equilibria. Economic theory is far from estab-
lishing a presumption that e®ects on native wages or employment need be harmful.
Indeed in general equilibrium models with a greater number of tradable products than
factors of production, provided immigration induces no change in the set of goods pro-
duced, its long run impact will be felt in quantities produced rather than in wages or
employment (see, for example, the discussions in Leamer and Levinsohn 1995, Borjas
1999b, Gaston and Nelson 2000). At the same time, empirical evidence establishing
the existence of adverse e®ects is scarce (see Borjas 1994, 1999b, and Friedberg and
Hunt 1995 for overviews1). Nevertheless simple models with a single output good and
multiple labour types do point to a possibility for immigration to harm certain workers
1Many of these studies relate to the US (for example, Altonji and Card 1991, Borjas, Freeman
and Katz 1996, Card 1990, 2001, Lalonde and Topel 1991) and typically use microdata from the US
census. Work on other countries includes Pischke and Velling (1994) and de New and Zimmermann
(1994, 1999) for Germany, Hunt (1992) for France, Carrington and Lima (1996) for Portugal and
Winter-Ebmer and ZweimÄ uller (1996, 1999) for Austria. The predominant, though not universal,
conclusion of most of this work is that the impact of immigration on wages and employment in local
labour markets is modest. See however Borjas (2002) for a recent contrary view.
1and it is not unlikely that individual perceptions of labour market threats accord with
the predictions of such models.
Labour market competition may however not be the only economic concern which
forms preferences towards immigration. According to Borjas (1999a, p.105), the second
economic issue in the historical debate over immigration policy in the United States is
whether immigrants pay their way in the welfare system. He argues that in the US,
immigrants receive a disproportionately large share of the welfare bene¯ts distributed.
Borjas (1997) draws attention to the possible impact of immigration on dependency
ratios, and the consequent e®ects on cost of the bene¯t and social security systems.
Since, under progressive taxation, the implied tax burden will bear more heavily on
richer households, this provides a possible reason for greater concern among those
with higher incomes. Fetzer (2000, p.14) notes the opposing implications of economic
theories: \While the labor market hypothesis tends to see xenophobia arising among
the economically disadvantaged, the use-of-services interpretation instead expects anti-
immigrant resentment primarily among the a²uent".2 On the other hand, if the budget
for welfare expenses is ¯xed, those at the bottom end of the distribution will su®er more.
In fact, there is evidence that public opinion is guided by the view that more im-
migrants are an additional burden on the welfare system. Studlar's (1977) empirical
study of popular British attitudes to immigration in the 1960s concludes that the
facts regarding the economic impact of immigration "have not erased the erroneous
mass perceptions of the relationships among immigrants, the economy and welfare ser-
vices, perceptions on which people base their immigration opinions." The Economist
(Vol. 355, 2000), in an editorial sympathetic to relaxed immigration policies into Eu-
rope, bluntly summarises the hostile sentiments that form a barrier to implementation
of such policies: \These new arrivals are popularly perceived as welfare-scroungers,
job-snatchers and threats to stability". Simon (1989) provides a history of anecdotal
evidence on public opinion towards further immigration, where both welfare consider-
2However the hypotheses may not be directly opposing. In one case it is low skills that matter and
on the other high incomes.
2ations and labour market fears are the two major concerns.
In addition to these two economic determinants, there is a third factor which may
shape preferences about further immigration. Opposition to immigration may be mo-
tivated by reasons which relate to the cultural and ethnic di®erence of the immigrant
population. Prejudices of this kind may arise from various sources. They may be fu-
elled by a fear of loss of national characteristics or a taste for cultural homogeneity.
Cultural and ethnic distance may severely hinder the social integration process, and
this may be considered as inducing social tensions and costs. There is ample evidence
that deeply rooted hostility exists towards immigration groups with largely di®erent
cultural and ethnic background and this hostility manifests itself in remarks of politi-
cians and opinion leaders. For instance, the then opposition leader and future British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher referred in a 1978 television interview to a British
fear of being \rather swamped by people with a di®erent culture" (Layton-Henry, 1992,
p. 184). The tone of recent UK debate over asylum seekers, with recurrence of the
language of "°ooding" and "swamping," drew condemnation from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (8 April 2000).
This discussion suggests that racial attitudes, labour market concerns, and welfare
concerns are three main factors which shape individual preferences towards further im-
migration. Recent papers by Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun
(2002), Mayda (2002), Schmidt and Fertig (2002), and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2003)
analyse the determinants of individual preferences over immigration policies in several
countries. In some of these papers, an empirical association between labour market
status and attitudes is established and argued to be consistent with a determining role
for labour market competition. Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2001) also point
to lower levels of hostility to immgrants among the more educated.3
Correlation between labour market characteristics and attitudes is, however, likely
to be a fragile basis for assessing the strength of labour market concerns in determin-
3Related issues come up also in the literature on preferences on trade policies - see for instance
papers by Mayda and Rodrik (2001), Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and O'Rourke and Sinnot (2001).
3ing attitudes for several reasons. Firstly, it is not always obvious which groups in the
labour market should be regarded as strongest competitors with potential immigrants
and it is therefore not easy to tell convincingly whether correlations which are found are
consistent or not with stories based on labour market competition. Secondly, educa-
tional background and the labour market status of natives are likely to a®ect attitudes
towards further immigration not only via this factor. Skilled workers may, compared
to unskilled workers, favour less restrictive immigration regulations because they have
less to lose in terms of wages. In addition, however, educational background may form
preferences towards further immigration because the better educated may have less pro-
nounced racial prejudices, or they are less a®ected by possible welfare consequences.
In consequence, simply noting an empirical association between characteristics like ed-
ucation and attitudes does not establish the primacy of labour market competition as
a driving factor. Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1995), for example, in their careful
study of US attitudes, note how the signi¯cance of labour market characteristics as
predictors of attitudes can be sensitive to inclusion of further attitudinal regressors.
An alternative approach seeks to determine the relative contributions of these forces
using correlations between attitudinal responses informative directly about hypothe-
sised underlying concerns. We implement such an approach, basing our analysis on
various waves of the British Social Attitudes Survey, spanning the period between
1983 and 1990. This extremely rich data set allows an analysis which marks an ad-
vance on previous work in several important respects. Firstly we make use of the
breadth of questions in the data source to relate preferences about immigration di-
rectly to the three factors discussed above, which we refer to as racial prejudice, labour
market concerns, and concerns about the welfare system. We attempt to separate the
relative e®ects of these three components on preferences towards immigration by using
information about concerns which relate directly to attitudes towards race, the labour
market and welfare.
No single question is likely to pick up these concerns uniquely and accurately but
if there are a number of questions addressing each dimension of concern then we can
4use the correlations among responses to identify the common component. In order to
make e±cient use of information from answers to the wide range of related questions
speaking to these hypothesised latent concerns in the data we specify and estimate a
multiple factor model. Such an approach should produce more reliable results than
relying on answers to single questions imprecisely capturing relevant concerns. Our
exposition includes a careful and thorough discussion of relevant identi¯cation issues.
Secondly our data set is unusual in distinguishing explicitly between attitudes to
immigration from di®erent countries of origin. Preferences towards further immigration
are likely to di®er according to the origin of the potential immigrant, and the degree
of ethnic and cultural distance. Our second contribution is to separate the role of the
three factors in driving attitudes regarding clearly distinguishable immigrant groups.
To achieve this, we di®erentiate between immigrant groups with di®erent degrees of
cultural and ethnic distance from the majority population. Racial prejudice is related
to the ethnic origin of immigrants, and may be more pronounced, the more dissimilar
the immigrant population is ethnically and culturally.
Thirdly the data set contains extremely speci¯c geographical information on respon-
dents, allowing us to merge in objective environmental information at a very precise
spatial level on local unemployment and ethnic composition.
Among the native population, we distinguish between di®erent occupation groups
(separating manual and non-manual workers), and di®erent education groups (separat-
ing low, medium and high education groups). This allows us to directly investigate the
association of racial prejudice, labour market concerns, and welfare concerns with pref-
erences towards more migration across di®erent skill levels. We therefore use a more
direct approach than Scheve and Slaughter (2001) in assessing whether the di®erences
in relative preferences towards further immigration across skill groups are compatible
with predictions of simple equilibrium trade and labour market models. Furthermore,
the distinction made in our data between immigrants of di®erent ethnic and cultural
background allows us to assess the relative association of each of these factors with pref-
erences towards further immigration for di®erent skill groups, and across immigrant
5populations of di®erent ethnic and cultural dissimilarity.
Our ¯ndings establish that both economic and racial factors appear to matter but
suggest that race is the dominant underlying issue. While it is not surprising that
either should play a role the relative extent of their importance is a point on which no
consensus is apparent in the literature and on which it is hoped that the results of this
paper o®er useful information.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
migration to the UK, documents skills and occupational achievements of immigrants,
and discusses the data we use. Section 3 reviews some theoretical issues regarding the
economic and cultural impact of immigration on interests of di®erent groups in the
population. Section 4 outlines our econometric model, and explains estimation and
identi¯cation of the parameters. Section 5 presents and discusses results, and section
6 concludes.
2 Immigrants in the UK
At the end of the second world war, the non-white immigrant population of the UK can
not have numbered more than one per cent of the population (Spencer 1997). Immigra-
tion law at the time, embodied in the 1948 British Nationality Act and 1905 Aliens Act,
distinguished formally between two types of foreign-born individuals: Commonwealth
and non-Commonwealth citizens. All Commonwealth citizens notionally enjoyed unre-
stricted freedom to enter the UK, though Spencer (1997) convincingly argues that this
was largely a convenient myth, disguising e®orts to restrain `coloured' immigration at
points prior to entry through administrative practice and collusion with Commonwealth
administrations.
Legal restrictions on the rights of immigration of British subjects were ¯rst in-
troduced in the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act. Entry for settlement without
family bonds to individuals already in the UK became conditional on issue of job
vouchers in various categories requiring pre-arranged jobs, possession of special skills
6or domestic needs for labour. In the subsequent decade, immigration regulations were
progressively tightened in view of continued black and Asian immigration at a rate of
30,000 to 50,000 people per year (see Wheatley-Price and Hatton 1990, Spencer 1997,
Money 2000, for more details). The 1971 Immigration Act ¯nally brought an end to
the privileged position of Commonwealth citizens, replacing the previous distinction
between aliens and British subjects with one between `patrials' and `non-patrials'. This
latter distinction essentially ended the settlement entitlements of non-white overseas
Commonwealth citizens. At the same time, Britain joined the European Commu-
nity and adhered to treaties which gave individuals the right of free movement across
community countries. The 1980s and 1990s saw continuing restrictive reforms to im-
migration legislation.
In accordance with these regulations, immigration of Commonwealth citizens was
most pronounced in the two decades after the war. The arrival of the Empire Win-
drush in 1948 with several hundred immigrants from Jamaica has come to symbolise
the commencement of large scale non-white immigration from New Commonwealth
countries. While the early 1950s were characterised by migration from the Caribbean,
in the late 1950s a growing number of immigrants arrived from the Indian subconti-
nent. Later migrants arrived from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Labour market shortages
in the period after the war led also to recruitment of European workers to ¯ll certain
labour market shortages. These workers were predominantly from Southern Europe,
but also from Poland. After the 1971 act, an increasing fraction of immigration was
due to family uni¯cation, which remained for a time largely unrestricted. Favourable
economic conditions in Europe prevented large migrations after 1971. Governmental
response to the Ugandan Asian crisis of 1972 nevertheless led, despite the restrictive
legislation by then adopted, to a renewed boost in settlement of Asian origin.
In table 1 we report some characteristics of the population of foreign born individ-
uals, based on the 1992 Labour Force Survey. Clear educational di®erences are evident
between native and the foreign born, with greater proportions of immigrants not having
completed secondary education. On the other side, a higher proportion of immigrants
7Table 1: Selected Characteristics of Native and Foreign-born, LFS 1992
Variable Natives Foreign West Indian, Bangladesh, India, Europe d New
Born African Pakistan, Uganda Asian Commonwealth e
Below Compulsory Educationa 27.16 33.78 33.40 47.90 33.32 11.49
Intermediate Educationb 62.90 51.00 55.54 40.51 56.78 62.66
High Educationc 9.91 15.20 11.04 11.57 9.87 25.83
Age 38.68 39.61 41.62 39.94 41.57 35.12
Years of Residence { 22.10 22.03 21.30 25.77 18.86
Age at arrival { 18.51 20.58 19.63 16.79 17.26
Year of arrival { 1970 1970 1971 1967 1974
Numbers in Sample 314225 28045 2898 9770 7150 1618
a: Below (Equivalent of) O'levels; b: (Equivalent of) O'levels or A'levels; c: College of
University; d Citizens of countries of the EU as of 1992, including Ireland. e: Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa.
8have been educated beyond secondary level. If we brake down these ¯gures according
to origin (where we have chosen origin so as to resemble most closely the suggested
origin regions in the set of questions on preferences to further immigration), we see that
there is large variation in educational background. The fraction of immigrants with
education beyond secondary level is for each origin at least as high as it is for the na-
tive population. However, with the exception of immigrants from New Commonwealth
countries, the percentage of individuals below compulsory education is likewise higher.
By far the best educated are individuals from the New Commonwealth countries. Im-
migrants from Europe resemble quite closely Natives in their educational structure.
Average age of natives and immigrants is similar on average, but varies quite consid-
erably across origin groups, with immigrants from the New Commonwealth countries
being the youngest. Immigrants are young upon arrival, with, on average, 22 years of
residence in the UK.
3 Data and Descriptives
Our attitudinal data is drawn from seven years of the British Social Attitudes Sur-
vey (1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990). We use the data for England and
concentrate on white respondents only.4
3.1 Attitudes
The BSA survey asks, for several years, questions concerning opinions about immi-
gration from di®erent origin countries. Speci¯cally, distinctions are drawn between
immigration from the West Indies, from India and Pakistan,5 from other countries in
4Racial identity is self-assessed. Attitudes of ethnic minority individuals towards their own com-
munities, or towards other ethnic minorities, are likely to be driven by di®erent mechanisms. While
it might be interesting to investigate their attitudes, the sample sizes within the BSA become very
small when considering attitudes of minorities only.
5Throughout the paper, we refer to this source of immigration as "Asian", in line with wording
typically used in the BSA.
9the European common market, and from New Zealand and Australia.6 We create bi-
nary variables for all these responses. In Appendix D, we report the full wording of
the original questions and some summary statistics.
Using the methodology we describe in section 5, we decompose these attitudes
into the three factors we have discussed above. For that purpose, we use an array
of questions which are speci¯c to the suggested underlying concerns of respondents.
In particular, questions related to race comprise opinions on inter ethnic marriage,
acceptability of an ethnic minority superior at work, and self rated prejudice against
minorities. Questions related to labour market concerns include fear of job loss, per-
ception of job security, perceived ease of ¯nding a new job, and expectations of wage
growth. Finally, questions related to welfare concerns cover opinions on generosity of
bene¯ts, needs of welfare recipients, and preparedness to pay higher taxes to expand
welfare provision. Again, the exact wording of the questions and summary statistics
are given in Appendix D.
Not all of these questions were asked in every year. The number of usable responses
to each question in each year is summarised in Appendix B in table A1, where usability
is determined by availability of data on both regressors and dependent variables. In our
estimation procedures, we make maximum use of the available data. All observations
covered in table A1 are used.
3.2 Regressors
The survey has extensive socioeconomic information on respondents, including educa-
tion, income, age, religion, and labour market status. In Table 2 we report summary
statistics on variables we use to explain attitudes. We use two variables describing the
characteristics of the locality of residence: the unemployment rate, and the concen-
tration of ethnic minorities. In both cases, we measure these variables at the county
level to minimise endogeneity issues arising from location choice (see Dustmann and
6The wording of these questions changed in 1991. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to the surveys
up to 1990.
10Table 2: Sample Statistics
Variables Mean StdD
Unemployment rate, County level 0.0437 0.0203
Ethnic minority concentration, county 0.0262 0.0285
Rank in Income Distribution 0.5008 0.2877
Manual worker 0.4555 0.4980
Ever unemployed 0.1687 0.3745
Ever long term unemployed 0.0609 0.2392
Female 0.5368 0.4986
High Education Level 0.1017 0.3022
Low Education Level 0.4991 0.5000
Age 45.936 17.706
Catholic 0.1005 0.3007
No religion 0.3462 0.4757
Preston, 2001, for a discussion of endogenous location).7
We relate attitudes to a set of variables that describe the individual's own charac-
teristics, like their income situation, labour market characteristics, education, age, sex,
and religious beliefs, and variables that describe the individual's environment, like the
local unemployment rate, and minority concentrations. The household income variable
is reported in banded form in the data. Rather than calculating a continuous measure
in units of income, we have computed the average percentile point of households in
that band in the income distribution, for the speci¯c year in which the individual is in-
terviewed. When thinking about the e®ect of income on attitudes, we have in mind the
e®ect of the relative position of the individual in the income distribution, rather than
some absolute income measure. Our de¯nition of household income seems therefore
quite natural in this context.
The average age of individuals in the sample is about 46 years. Age is likely to a®ect
attitudes for several reasons. First, it is a direct measure of life experience. Second,
it marks the position of the individual in their economic cycle. At some stages of this
cycle, individuals' attitudes may be more strongly a®ected by economic considerations.
7County is an administrative unit, covering on average 1.27 million people, and corresponding
plausibly to a local labour market.
11Table 3: Migration attitudes, di®erent segments
All Manual Non-Manual High Ed. Medium Ed. Low Ed.
Response Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
West Indian 66.46 69.48 65.56 50.45 55.05 70.36
Asian 70.58 75.08 68.46 50.36 68.90 75.61
European 46.21 51.19 43.19 30.80 44.91 50.09
Australians, New Zealand 33.19 34.63 32.96 27.17 35.38 33.62
Response variable: 1 if prefers less settlement of respective population group.
Respondents: white.
Finally, the age variable captures cohort e®ects.
We also include dummy variables indicating whether the individual is a manual
worker, has ever been in unemployment, either short or long term, and is female.
We classify people into three education categories. We allocate individuals to the
high education category if they remained in education beyond age 18, and to a low
education category if they did not remain in school beyond either age 15, or the com-
pulsory school leaving age (whichever is earlier). Education is likely to a®ect attitudes
for several reasons. Higher education may shape attitudes by exposing the individual
to a wider range of views. Education is also likely to pick up aspects of peoples' long
term economic prospects which are not captured by the before mentioned variables.
We have also added two variables on religious beliefs, re°ecting whether the in-
dividual is Catholic, or not religious. Attitudes may be in°uenced both by the high
weight placed by many religions on the virtue of tolerance but also by any tendencies
to particularism that may be associated with speci¯c creeds. It is also possible that
religious a±liation may re°ect historic experiences of persecution or current feelings of
marginality (Fetzer 2000) of particular groups of the population.
3.3 Descriptive Results
In table 3 we report responses to the questions regarding further immigration for dif-
ferent education groups, and for manual and non manual workers.
12The numbers indicate that the majority of respondents oppose further settlement of
ethnically di®erent populations (the ¯rst two rows in the table), with manual workers
having a slightly more negative attitude than non-manual workers. Across education
groups, there is a clear tendency towards support for a more restrictionist immigra-
tion policy, the lower the educational background of the respondent. For all potential
immigrant populations, the same pattern is evident, but preferences towards further
immigration become more supportive, the less ethnically di®erent the immigrant pop-
ulation. For Australians and individuals from New Zealand, there is no majority of
respondents in any group favouring less settlement.
Of course, it is dangerous to read too much into these simple comparisons, since
typical migrants from ethnically di®erent origins are also likely to di®er in typical skill
composition, as can be seen in table 1.
These simple conditional means do indicate some relationship between preferences
towards migration, and the ethnic distance of the migrant population in question. They
also suggest di®erent preferences according to skill level. However, they do not control
for other determinants of preferences towards further immigration. As a next step,
we estimate probit models, where we add, besides occupational status and education,
regressors which characterise the individual and the individual's environment. Means
of the variables are given in table 2.
In table 4, we report marginal e®ects, evaluated at the sample mean. The reported
coe±cients on binary variables are the di®erences in probabilities between the groups
for which the binary variable takes the value unity and the base group.
To re°ect the skill level of the individual, we include binary variables for low and
high education, with intermediate education being the excluded category. We also add
a binary variable for manual workers.
The education variables are all strongly signi¯cant. Overall, our estimates indi-
cate that the more educated are more favourable towards further immigration. These
¯ndings are in line with those of Scheve and Slaughter (2001), of Bauer, Lofstrom
and Zimmermann (2001) and of Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1997). There is an
13Table 4: Immigration Probits
Variable Less West Indian Less Asian Less Euro Less Australian
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Unemployment rate -0.3445 -0.74 -0.6683 -1.51 0.4196 0.86 -0.1918 -0.42
Ethnic minor. conc. -0.0075 -1.06 0.0017 0.11 -0.0002 -0.03 0.0036 0.51
Income Rank 0.0983 3.18 0.0809 2.74 0.0307 0.93 0.0594 1.92
Manual worker 0.0058 0.37 0.0293 1.93 0.0476 2.84 0.0107 0.68
Ever unemployed -0.0149 -0.68 -0.0065 -0.31 -0.0072 -0.30 0.0104 0.47
Ever long term unemp. 0.0181 0.50 -0.0168 -0.48 0.0145 0.37 -0.0501 -1.38
Female 0.0023 0.16 -0.0002 -0.02 0.0202 1.30 0.0065 0.44
Compulsory Education 0.0482 2.85 0.0683 4.20 0.0459 2.57 0.0072 0.43
High Education Level -0.1505 -5.80 -0.1722 -6.85 -0.1234 -4.54 -0.0974 -3.94
Age 0.0522 2.14 0.0299 1.29 0.1217 4.69 0.1640 6.48
Age2 -0.0018 -0.72 -0.0017 -0.30 -0.0103 -3.91 -0.0184 -7.00
Catholic -0.0691 -2.82 -0.0747 -3.16 -0.0296 -1.15 -0.0305 -1.25
No religion 0.0145 0.94 0.0002 0.01 0.0175 1.06 0.0272 1.74
Sample size 4624 4650 4638 4644
Marginal E®ects, evaluated at sample means.
All Estimations include time dummies.
interesting pattern of preferences across di®erent origin countries. While the highly
educated are on average 17 percentage points less likely to be in favour of restrictive
immigration policies towards immigrants from Asia (as compared to individuals with
intermediate education), this reduces to 15 points for immigrants from the West Indies,
to 13 for immigration from Europe, and to 9 for immigration from Australia and New
Zealand. Similarly, when comparing individuals in the lowest education category with
individuals with intermediate education, the sharpest di®erences are for immigration
from Asia, while di®erences in preferences regarding immigration from Australia and
New Zealand seem to vanish. Manual workers seem to be more supportive of more
restrictionist migration policies, but the di®erence, conditional on other characteris-
tics, is signi¯cant only for Europeans and Asians. This suggests that the association
of education with attitudes towards further immigration changes with the degree of
cultural and ethnic distance of the prospective immigrant population, with di®erences
14being largest across occupational groups for the most ethnically divers groups.
The e®ect of our income measure, which is the rank of the individual in the in-
come distribution in that particular year shows that individuals in higher quantiles of
the distribution are more opposed to further immigration. Other things being equal,
an individual one decile higher in the income distribution appears to be about one
percentage point more likely to oppose further Asian or West Indian immigration. In-
terestingly, this estimated income e®ect is in accord with what would be expected if
those bearing a higher burden of any imagined tax consequences were more opposed
to immigration (see Fetzer 2000).
Overall, our ¯ndings echo those of Scheve and Slaughter (2001), who estimate
similar models for the US. They take these ¯ndings as being supportive of the view
that preferences for further immigration are distributed across skill groups according
to predictions of simple equilibrium models. Our results have also indicated however
that the origin of the potential immigrant population may relate to the way views on
further immigration di®er across education groups, which suggest that racial prejudice
is an additional important factor to explain these preferences. To further explore this
hypothesis, we now turn to a more structural analysis, by trying to isolate the direct
e®ect of racial attitudes, labour market concerns, and welfare concerns on preferences
towards further migration.
4 Separating Factors in Attitudes to Immigration
4.1 Econometric Speci¯cation
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to identify the contribution of racial
prejudice, welfare concerns, and labour market concerns in forming attitudes towards
further migration. Other studies (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Gang, Rivera-Batiz and
Yun (2002), Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong 1997) add responses to individual ques-
tions about, say, racial tolerance to regressions explaining openness to immigration
as a way of capturing the role of such considerations. In all of these papers, racial
15intolerance is found to be a signi¯cant determinant of immigration attitudes. However
answers to a single question are liable to pick up the underlying attitude with consider-
able measurement error. The BSA data contains answers to several pertinent questions
for each of the hypothesised dimensions to attitudes that we wish to consider. We can
use this multiplicity to isolate the common element to responses, e±ciently identifying
the underlying variation of interest but to do so requires developing a model of the
type we now proceed to outline.
What we propose to do is not dissimilar to the idea of taking leading principal com-
ponents of responses, rotating to sustain an attitudinal interpretation and regressing
immigration responses on the resulting scores. However the model allows us to impose
strong identifying restrictions avoiding concerns about identi¯cation and invariance to
rotation typically associated with conventional factor analysis. We also take full ac-
count of the discrete nature of questionnaire responses, correctly derive standard errors
accounting for imprecision at all stages of estimation and report tests of the extensive
overidentifying restrictions involved in our approach.
To begin with, we observe only discrete responses to the immigration questions yi
and we assume corresponding latent variables y¤
i:
y
¤ = f ¤ + X A + u; (1)
where y¤ is an n £ m matrix of latent attitudinal responses to m immigration
questions for n individuals, and A is a k£m matrix of conditional responses of attitudes
to k other observed characteristics X. The matrix f is an n£p matrix of factor scores
capturing the p underlying dimensions to attitudes towards immigration, and ¤ is
a p £ m matrix of factor loadings, which map the factor scores into the attitudinal
responses. In our case m = 4 since there are four sources of immigration covered by
the BSA questions and p = 3 with factors corresponding to race, labour market and
welfare concerns. We assume that the error terms in the n£m matrix u are normally
distributed, with u » N(0;§u), and uncorrelated with either X or f.
The factors are themselves allowed to be in°uenced by the regressors X:
16f = X B + v ; (2)
where B is a k£p matrix of coe±cients in the underlying lower dimensional model.
We assume that v » N(0;§v). The assumption that u is uncorrelated with X or f
implies that u and v are not correlated.
As we discuss above, the factors are not directly observable phenomena. Instead,
we observe an array of responses to q questions on issues which are each strongly re-
lated to one or other of these factors. These include three sets of questions. First,
questions indicating racial attitudes: speci¯cally, attitudes towards inter ethnic mar-
riage, having a minority boss, and self admitted prejudice against minorities. Secondly,
there are questions regarding labour market security: speci¯cally questions on fear of
job loss, ease of ¯nding a job and expected future wage paths. Thirdly, there is a set
of questions indicating welfare concerns, including a question on adequacy of bene¯t
levels, perception of recipients' need, and willingness to pay for increased public social
spending. Again, only discrete outcomes on these variables are observed. The latent
indices relate to the factors as follows:
z
¤ = f M + X C + w; (3)
where z¤ is a n£q matrix of latent responses, M is a p£q matrix of factor loadings,
C is a k £ q matrix of conditional responses to X, and w is an n £ q matrix of error
terms, which are distributed normally, with w » N(0;§w). As with u, w is assumed
uncorrelated with X and f and therefore also with v. Since the questions have been
chosen to be indicative solely of responses to speci¯c factors we make an assumption
of block diagonality on M which is important in establishing identi¯cation.
This structure implies an estimable reduced form, which can easily be obtained by
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is the (m + q) £ (m + q) variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals
and §uw denotes E(uw0). After estimating the reduced form coe±cient matrix, and
the variance covariance matrix, we impose restrictions on these coe±cents by minimum
distance to identify the parameters of interest in ¤. Identi¯cation and details of the
estimation are given below.
4.2 Estimation
Our estimation strategy proceeds in two stages.8 The reduced form (4) has two kinds
of parameters: Coe±cients ¡ and variance-covariance parameters §². In stage 1, we
estimate the coe±cients of each equation (corresponding to the rows of ¡) separately by
independent (ordered) probits. In the second stage, we take each pairing of questions
successively and estimate the corresponding o®-diagonal component of §² by bivariate
8All programs are written in GAUSS by the authors.
18maximum likelihood, ¯xing the coe±cients of the two equations concerned at the values
estimated at the previous stage.9
Computation of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters is described in
full in Appendix A. The argument follows the standard procedure of expanding the
score vector. The only complication which arises in our case is the use of di®erent
likelihoods at di®erent points in the estimation procedure. We follow Muth¶ en (1984)
in resolution of the problems that this raises.
Before imposing the restrictions in (5) and (6) we can use these reduced form esti-
mates to assess the association between immigration attitudes and indicator responses
by noting
E(y ¤ jX;z¤) = X(¡1 ¡ §12 §
¡1
22 ¡2) + §12 §
¡1
22 z¤ (7)
and calculating the latent regression coe±cients §12 §
¡1
22 .
We then impose the restrictions in (5) and (6) in a further step by minimum dis-
tance. The estimation procedure outlined above does not, however, guarantee positive
semi de¯niteness of the estimated asymptotic variance - covariance matrix for the pa-
rameter estimates ^ ­ (see Appendix A for derivation). In practice, we ¯nd ^ ­ to have a
few small negative eigenvalues. It can therefore not be used as the weighting matrix.
We chose as an alternative weighting matrix the diagonal matrix dg(^ ­) containing the
diagonal elements of ^ ­.10 Since this is not the optimal weighting matrix the minimised
value of the criterion does not give the standard Â2 test of the restrictions so we use
the formula in Newey (1985).11
9Not all of the questions used are asked in every year of our sample but there is su±cient overlap
to identify all reduced form parameters. We require each possible pair of questions to be asked at
least once in the same year.
10Another idea would be to use the positive semi de¯nite matrix obtained from ^ ­ by replacing
the negative eigenvalues by zeros in the spectral decomposition. We found this to give very unstable
results.
11Bearing in mind the small-sample concerns raised by Altonji and Segal (1996), we also calculate,
for comparison, equally weighted minimum distance estimates using the identity matrix as weighting
matrix.
194.3 Identi¯cation
Identi¯cation is frequently a matter of concern in these types of models (see Bartholomew
and Knott 1999, Maddala 1983, Muth¶ en 1979)). We provide a heuristic discussion
which establishes identi¯cation in our case.
Note that because of the discrete nature of the dependent variables we can esti-
mate only the ratios of the elements of ¡ to the standard deviations of the associated
components of ². Likewise we can estimate only the matrix of correlations associated
with §². We adopt the identifying normalisation that the diagonal elements in §u and
in §w are such as to make the diagonal elements of §² equal to unity.
Identi¯cation of M and §v
Fundamental to our procedure is the use of the indicator questions to locate variation in
the factors. Identi¯cation of M and §v are therefore crucial. We achieve this through
the assumptions that each of our indicator questions is indicative of one and only one
factor and that all correlation between responses to these questions (conditional on the
regressors X) is accounted for by the factor structure.
Speci¯cally, we assume ¯rstly that M is a block diagonal matrix, with only one non-
zero element in each row. That is to say, we assume that each response in z¤ is indicative
of one and only one factor. Secondly, we assume diagonality of the §w matrix, so that
all correlation between these responses is accounted for by the factor structure. Finally,
we set the diagonal elements of §v to unity, which is simply a normalising assumption.
These parameters are then identi¯ed by the restriction §22 = §w + M §v M0.
The elements of M, which are the loadings of the factors on the indicator ques-
tions, are identi¯ed from the conditional correlations between responses within blocks.
Remembering the particular block diagonal structure of M, suppose that the ith block
has qi elements. Then there are qi (qi¡1)=2 o®-diagonal elements in the corresponding
block of §22 from which to identify them. This is su±cient only if qi ¸ 3. This is so
for each block in our case.
20Having identi¯ed M, the o®-diagonal elements of §v are then identi¯ed without
further restriction from the remaining elements of §22, that is to say from the correla-
tions between elements in di®erent blocks. Notice that we allow for correlation between
the factors since §v is not required to be diagonal. Since all conditional correlation
between responses in di®erent blocks is assumed to be driven solely by the correlation
between factors considerable overidentifying restrictions are involved at this point. We
report tests of these restrictions.
Identi¯cation of ¤
Now consider identi¯cation of the main parameters of interest, ¤. We identify these
parameters from the conditional correlations between answers to the indicator questions
and the questions on immigration under the assumption that this is driven solely by the
role of the hypothesised factors. It may be helpful to note that this is the same source
of variation that would be used to identify dependence of immigration on underlying
attitudes if immigration responses were regressed on answers to indicator questions.
Speci¯cally, we set §uw = 0 and use §12 = M §v ¤0. That is to say, we assume
that all conditional correlation between responses to the immigration questions and
the indicator questions is accounted for by the factors of interest. With M and §v
identi¯ed elsewhere, this is su±cient to identify ¤ if p · q, which is to say that there
are fewer factors than indicator questions - a basic assumption.12
Our main focus of attention are the coe±cients in ¤ and it is therefore important
to be clear about comparability of the reported coe±cients across rows and columns.
Note that ¤ = dy¤=df and neither y¤ nor f, both being latent, have a unique natural
12An alternative approach which would work in some cases, though not in this case, and which
we would not favour anyway, would be to assume diagonality of §u and use the restriction §11 =
§u +¤§v ¤0. This alone gives only m(m¡1)=2 reduced form parameters from which to identify the
mp parameters in ¤ and is therefore su±cient only if p · (m ¡ 1)=2. This is not so in our example.
Besides, this seems to us a less desirable restriction to impose. We do not wish to exclude the existence
of other sources of correlation between immigration responses, provided they are orthogonal to the
factors of interest.
21scale of variation. It is the commonality of normalisation13 imposed here that justi¯es
comparability of coe±cients within ¤.
5 Model Results
5.1 The full sample
We ¯rst discuss results we obtain for the full sample. We then split the sample accord-
ing to skill and educational groups. These results are discussed further below. The
underlying probit estimates are reported in Appendix B
We begin by reporting in Table 5 the implied regression coe±cients §12 §
¡1
22 . These
are based on imposition of none of the structure implied by (5) or (6) and are included
for the indication which they o®er of the underlying source of the more structural esti-
mates below. Under the supposed model they should equal ¤§v M0(§w+M §v M0)¡1.
The di®ering signi¯cance of individual attitudinal indicators is driven in part by the
di®erences in numbers of available responses summarised in Table ??. What is very
clear is that the strongest evidence of association is that between indicators of racial
attitudes and hostility to immigration from the West Indies and Asia.
Imposing the restrictions in (5) and (6) should a®ord considerable gains both in
interpretative clarity and in precision of estimates. We begin by estimating M and
§v, imposing only the substantive assumptions of block diagonality, and diagonality
on §w to identify the indicator loadings in M and the correlations between factors
in §v. The results are reported in Table Appendix C in Appendix C. Identi¯cation
of these matrices is crucial to our estimation strategy and it is important that the
overidentifying restrictions are accepted - this is comfortably so according to the Newey
Â2 test reported in the Appendix and below Table 6.
We then add the restriction §uw = 0 and use §12 = ¤§v M0 to identify the main
parameters of interest, ¤. We report the estimates of the parameters in ¤ in Table
13That is to say, the residual variances along the diagonals of §² and §v are each set to unity.
22Table 5: Estimates of §12 §¡1
22 , all respondents
Variable Less West Indian Less Asian Less Euro Less Australian
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Racial attitudes
Marriage 0.0394 0.4907 0.0766 0.7412 0.0151 0.1509 -0.0870 -1.0320
Boss 0.1637 1.4819 0.1271 0.9864 -0.0264 -0.1906 -0.0280 -0.2517
Prejudice 0.3220 4.0393 0.4192 3.4591 0.1432 0.9968 0.0892 0.5577
Joint Â2
3 73.766 76.045 3.115 1.513
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.374 0.679
Job attitudes
Job loss 0.0261 0.4128 -0.0310 -0.4054 -0.0082 -0.0930 0.0445 0.4743
Find job -0.0006 -0.0070 0.0109 0.1049 0.1134 0.7903 -0.0240 -0.2469
Wage 0.0631 0.7098 0.0600 0.7422 0.0086 0.0649 0.0131 0.1510
Job security 0.0781 0.9518 0.1484 1.0990 0.0012 0.0091 0.0010 0.0089
Joint Â2
4 2.877 2.379 1.181 0.514
P-value 0.579 0.667 0.881 0.972
Welfare attitudes
Bene¯ts 0.0132 0.1287 0.0721 0.4759 -0.0246 -0.1307 -0.0421 -0.2618
Need 0.1076 1.1801 0.0679 0.5350 0.1004 1.0756 0.0928 0.8994
More spending -0.0069 -0.0664 -0.0004 -0.0037 0.0368 0.4415 0.0191 0.2035
Joint Â2
3 3.423 0.910 2.607 0.929
P-value 0.331 0.823 0.456 0.819
23Table 6: MDE estimates of ¤, all respondents
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)¤
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
West Indian 0.471 11.25 0.158 2.20 0.180 2.90 0.682
Asian 0.540 11.36 0.159 2.09 0.219 3.23 0.578
European 0.119 3.23 0.122 1.64 0.129 2.17 0.953
Aust.,N.Z 0.003 0.08 0.116 1.56 0.091 1.49 0.984
Newey M1 Â2
32 = 40.463 P-value = 0.145
Newey M2 Â2
60 = 62.515 P-value = 0.387
Newey M3 Â2
203 = 31592.597 P-value = 0.000
Restrictions imposed: §22 = §w + M §v M0, §12 = ¤§v M0
Newey M1 is a test of §22 = §w + M §v M0
Newey M2 is a joint test of §22 = §w + M §v M0 and §12 = ¤§v M0
Newey M1 is a joint test of §22 = §w +M §v M0, §12 = ¤§v M0 and ¡ = B ( ¤ M )0
(6)14. The over identifying restrictions are again very easily accepted at usual signi¯-
cance levels. This suggests that it may not be inappropriate to think that the condi-
tional correlations between the immigration responses and responses to the indicator
questions can be accounted for through the supposed factor structure.
The most striking result is the strength, both quantitatively and statistically, of
the impact of racial attitudes on hostility to immigration from the West Indies or from
Asia. There is some evidence of a similar component to attitudes towards European
immigration but not to immigration from Australia and New Zealand.
Estimated e®ects from job insecurity are weaker but there do appear to be signi¯-
cant positive e®ects on attitudes to immigration from the West Indies and Asia though
much less as regards immigration from Europe or the antipodes. Hostility to welfare
spending seems similarly correlated. Overall none of the factors seem to have any obvi-
ous bearing on attitudes to immigration from Australia or New Zealand. The ¯gures in
the last column, headed diag(§u), can be interpreted as the proportion of the residual
variance regarding attitudes to immigration from the source in question which is not
14Equally weightedminimum distance estimates are reported in Appendix Appendix E and are very
close.
24associated with any of the factors. For immigration from the more ethnically distinct
sources, from one half to two thirds of the residual variance remains unaccounted for in
terms of the factor model. For immigration from Australia and New Zealand, almost
all remains unaccounted for.
These ¯ndings tend to suggest that racial prejudice is by far the most important
component explaining negative inclinations towards immigration of ethnically di®erent
populations. Although labour market fears and welfare concerns are found to have
a signi¯cant impact, their e®ects are much lower than that of the racial factor. In
this respect the results are similar to those found for the United States by Citrin,
Green, Muste and Wong 1997. For ethnically and culturally more similar groups (i.e.
Europeans), the picture is very di®erent. Now the estimated contributions of welfare
and job concerns are as strong as those of racial prejudices. As regards the ¯nal
group of Australians and New Zealanders, who are typically culturally very similar and
ethnically hardly distinguishable from the majority population, none of these factors
seems associated with negative attitudes towards further immigration.15 Note that the
overall response towards these populations is more friendly than towards other groups
(see Table (3)), but nevertheless, more immigration is opposed by about 30 percent of
the majority population.
The ¯nal test statistic reported below Table 6 is for the restriction A = 0, C = 0
which would allow B to be inferred simply from ¡ given our estimates of ¤ and M.
These restrictions are very strongly rejected and we do not report the estimates of B.
5.2 Skill and Education Groups
Our discussion above suggests that individuals in di®erent sectors of the labour market,
or of di®erent skill levels, may have reasons to view immigration di®erently. It has often
been argued that manual workers, as well as less skilled workers, are more vulnerable
15These results go some way to addressing the agenda for future research raised by Citrin, Green,
Muste and Wong (1997, p,877): \it is unknown whether the public would be more receptive if the
main body of immigrants more closely resembled the dominant segment of the `native' population in
appearance and culture."
25to low skilled immigration (Borjas 1999). If so, then one might expect that this would
show up in a di®erence in the factors driving attitudes of workers in distinct labour
market segments.
Our simple summary statistics on the attitude responses, split up in di®erent labour
market groups (see table 3), indicate that attitudes towards further immigration tend
to be more hostile among manual than non-manual workers; furthermore, hostility
decreases with educational background. Although our analysis above takes account
of variables describing these segments by incorporating them as regressors, we now
estimate separate systems for the di®erent groups. We estimate separate reduced
forms for the di®erent subgroups (for example, manual and non-manual workers). The
restrictions imposed di®er in allowing all coe±cients of the ¤ matrix to vary between
population subgroups.16 These are typically the strongest restrictions accepted and
allow identi¯cation of ¤i.17
Manual and non-manual workers
We report results of the coe±cients in ¤i for manual and non-manual workers in Ta-
ble (7). The Newey test indicates that the restrictions imposed are clearly accepted.
The results show that the impact of racial prejudice remains strong amongst manual
workers. The in°uence of the other two components is very small, and estimates are
very imprecise. Again, the racial factor is important for attitudes towards further im-
migration from Asia and the West Indies, less important for Europe, and vanishes for
Australia/New Zealand.
For non-manual workers, the in°uences of the race factor remain strong, but the
relative importance of labour market concerns and welfare concerns increases. For
the ¯rst two immigration groups, the e®ect is of a magnitude approaching that of the
racial factor. For Europeans, job and welfare concerns are strong, while the racial
16The restrictions imposed are §22i = §w + M §v M0 and §12i = M §v ¤0
i, where i corresponds
to the subgroups (for example, manual and non manual).
17We restrict the sample to the employed. This has almost no e®ect on results and we do not
provide a separate Table for these.
26Table 7: MDE estimates of ¤, by manual/non-manual, employed only
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
Manual
West Indian 0.482 5.64 0.130 0.80 0.089 0.69 0.721
Asian 0.551 5.76 0.137 0.68 0.086 0.59 0.645
European 0.132 1.93 0.116 0.71 0.130 1.15 0.950
Aust.,N.Z -0.035 -0.47 -0.017 -0.10 0.109 0.90 0.988
Non-Manual
West Indian 0.442 6.80 0.235 1.80 0.310 3.04 0.607
Asian 0.483 6.86 0.308 2.54 0.416 3.90 0.443
European 0.073 1.22 0.226 1.74 0.197 2.19 0.923
Aust.,N.Z -0.010 -0.14 0.238 1.72 0.117 1.19 0.948
Newey M2 Â2
133 = 150.833 P-value = 0.138
Newey M1 Â2
77 = 84.083 P-value = 0.272
Restrictions imposed: §22i = §w + M §v M0, §12i = ¤i §v M0 Newey M2 is a joint
test of §22i = §w + M §v M0 and §12i = ¤i §v M0 for all i. Newey M1 is a test of
§22i = §w + M §v M0 for alli
factor practically vanishes. For Australians and New Zealanders, the in°uence of the
race factor is also zero, but there is now some evidence of the presence of welfare and
job factors.
It is notable that welfare and labour market concerns have a negligible impact on
the opinions of manual workers towards any of the immigrant populations, in sharp
contrast to the non-manual workers. It may be that in reality economic competition
from potential immigrants is strongest for the more skilled. Alternatively, the strong
presence of the racial component for this group may be an indication that the process
of opinion formation is being based on simpler prejudicial perceptions rather than
more elaborate opinions about the impact or consequences of immigration. To further
investigate these issues, we now split up the sample into three education groups.
27Table 8: MDE estimates of ¤ by education group, employed only
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
High Education
West Indian 0.385 1.84 0.666 1.91 0.742 2.50 0.019
Asian 0.411 2.15 0.696 2.08 0.790 2.62 0.00
European -0.005 -0.03 0.539 1.53 0.497 1.83 0.645
Australian -0.024 -0.15 0.460 1.43 0.433 1.61 0.741
Medium Education
West Indian 0.429 4.28 0.235 1.17 0.338 2.29 0.613
Asian 0.445 4.49 0.262 1.32 0.435 2.85 0.505
European 0.078 0.94 0.237 1.13 0.275 1.85 0.893
Australian 0.043 0.48 0.242 1.06 0.093 0.64 0.944
Low Education
West Indian 0.498 7.94 0.096 0.67 0.076 0.74 0.718
Asian 0.574 7.40 0.112 0.65 0.113 0.93 0.615
European 0.127 2.47 0.089 0.59 0.064 0.71 0.971
Australian -0.034 -0.62 0.039 0.26 0.074 0.78 0.995
Newey M2 Â2
206 = 164.527 P-value = 0.985
Newey M1 Â2
122 = 76.668 P-value = 1.000
Restrictions imposed: §22i = §w + M §v M0, §12i = ¤i §v M0 Newey M2 is a joint
test of §22i = §w + M §v M0 and §12i = ¤i §v M0 for all i. Newey M1 is a test of
§22i = §w + M §v M0 for alli.
28Low, medium, and high education
We refer to the three education groups as low education, medium education, and high
education according to the age at which the respondent left full time education. Results
for the coe±cients in the ¤i matrices are displayed in Table (8). The very high P-value
indicates that the restrictions are very comfortably accepted. 18
Racial factors are in°uential in all the three groups, though most strongly in the
group with lowest education. This is the only group in which racial factors seem
relevant to European immigration. Labour market concerns are evident only for the
highest education group, and welfare concerns only for the high and medium education
groups. The relative importance of economic as against racial factors has a clear
education gradient, ¯guring more prominently the higher the education level of the
subsample considered.
These results con°ict with the common expectation that it is hostility towards
immigration amongst the least skilled and least educated that is driven by economic
concerns. In fact, our results indicate that it is the views of the most educated that
are most in°uenced by economic factors.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
It is commonly argued that immigrants may be a burden on welfare and public services,
and that immigration may lead to job displacement of native workers (see Borjas
1999 for an example of such arguments or Simon 1989 for a more skeptical view). If
these views are shared by large numbers of the public then (independently of whether
they are justi¯ed) such concerns may be an important component of aversion towards
further immigration. If these considerations contribute towards opinions on migration
issues, then policies related to labour market security and welfare spending may have
important secondary e®ects on public opinion about and resistance towards further
immigration. By way of contrast, if hostility towards immigration is rooted in racial
18Note that we have imposed the binding restriction of nonnegativity on one element of diag(§u).
29hostility then it may be less responsive to more economic interventions.
This paper attempts to assess the importance of welfare and labour market con-
cerns, as well as racially inclined considerations for the formation of opinions towards
further immigration. Our results are interesting in several respects. First, we do ¯nd
evidence that both welfare and labour market concerns matter for the opinion towards
further immigration. However, by far the most important single factor appears to be
racially motivated opposition.
Second, we ¯nd that attitudes towards immigration, and the relative importance
of the three factors, di®er according to the ethnic origin of the immigrant population
concerned. Our results indicate that a negative attitude towards further immigration
is strongly related to all the three factors for Asians and West Indians, while it is less
strongly explained for Europeans. The factors we have de¯ned hardly explain at all
the attitudes towards Australians and New Zealanders, which suggests that opposition
towards immigration from such sources is scarcely linked to any of our systematic
factors. The dominant racial factor is particularly strong for the Asian and West
Indian population, the two groups that are ethnically more di®erent.
Third, we do not ¯nd strong evidence that the greater labour market concerns some-
times believed to exist among unskilled and manual workers are re°ected in opposition
towards further immigration. The underlying supposition of such a belief that potential
immigrants are in fact mostly unskilled, selecting themselves into manual jobs, may
well be unfounded anyway. We ¯nd that welfare and labour market concerns are more
closely linked to opinions towards further immigration for non-manual workers than
for manual workers, and for the more educated rather than the less educated. Again,
as above, there are for all subgroups distinct di®erences according to origin country,
with racial factors being stronger for ethnically more di®erent populations.
These results con°ict with the frequently expressed opinion that greater hostility to
immigration amongst the economically more disadvantaged sections of the population
is driven by fear of economic competition in labour markets. On the contrary, we
¯nd an association between labour market concerns and hostility to immigration only
30amongst better educated and more skilled sections of the labour force. Antipathy
towards immigration amongst manual and poorly educated workers is associated only
and strongly with racial attitudes. This may re°ect di®erences in the process of opinion
formation towards immigration depending on levels of education. There are at least
two explanations for this: Either education itself makes economic arguments more
accessible to those educated, or education attracts those more inclined to think in such
terms.
Economic policy interventions, which reduce job insecurity or welfare concerns,
appear likely therefore to be e®ective only in reducing hostility to immigration amongst
the better educated and more highly skilled sections of the labour market. Addressing
the antipathy to immigration at the lower end of the spectrum of skills and education
requires engaging the stereotypes which underlie the racial antagonisms driving these
attitudes.
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36Appendix A Estimation
We estimate the reduced form in a two stage procedure to obtain estimates of ¡ and
§². We estimate ¡ by a series of independent (ordered) probits. We then estimate the
components of §² by pairwise bivariate Maximum Likelihood, conditional upon the
estimated probit coe±cients. Not all of the questions used are asked in every year of
our sample but there is su±cient overlap to identify all reduced form parameters.
This estimation procedure is similar to that suggested by Muth¶ en (1984) or by
Browne and Arminger (1995). Our derivation of the variance covariance matrix for the
estimates draws on the arguments of Muth¶ en and Satorra (1995).
Let µ1 denote the vector of parameters estimated by independent ordered probits
in the ¯rst stage (which is to say the vector of the elements of ¡) and let µ2 denote the
vector of parameters estimated by pairwise bivariate likelihood maximisation at the
second stage (which is to say the vector of all generically distinct o®-diagonal elements
of §²). Let µ ´ (µ0
1;;µ
0
2)0 denote the vector of all reduced form parameters.
Let li(µ) denote a vector of the same dimensions as µ the elements of which are
the log likelihood contributions of the ith respondent to estimation of the correspond-
ing elements of µ. Note that di®erent likelihoods are used to estimate parameters at









de¯ne a partition of li(µ) into elements corresponding to ¯rst and second stage
estimations.
The estimates ^ µ ´ (^ µ
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2(^ µ1; ^ µ2) = 0:
37Denote by qi(^ µ) ´ (qi
1(^ µ1)0;qi
2(^ µ1; ^ µ2)0)0 the vector of stacked score contributions for
the ith respondent and by q(^ µ) ´
P
i qi(^ µ) = 0 the score vector.
By the Mean Value Theorem
0 = q(^ µ) = q(µ) + Q(~ µ)(^ µ ¡ µ)
for some ~ µ between ^ µ and µ, where Q(µ) ´@q(µ)=@µ. Therefore
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so that we can consistently estimate V and the block lower triangular matrix A by
taking the outer products of gradients indicated. We can thereby consistently estimate
the asymptotic variance covariance matrix of the estimates by ^ ­ ´ ^ A¡1^ V^ A
0¡1
.
38Appendix B First Step Probit Results
Table A1: Sample Sizes by Year
Variables 83 84 85 86 87 89 90 Total
Less West Indian 1140 1051 757 883 804 4635
Less Asian 1156 1060 756 885 804 4661
Less European 1151 1056 756 883 803 4649
Less Australian 1155 1058 754 882 806 4655
Marriage 1186 1113 833 1015 4147
Boss 1199 1117 850 1022 4188
Prejudice 1218 1118 1185 1615 1945 2085 897 10063
Job Loss 1221 1132 1193 1631 2094 1793 9064
Find Job 652 652
Wage Exp 596 578 600 846 976 1058 918 5572
Job Security 590 590
Bene¯ts 1149 1052 1121 1545 1849 1943 1641 10300
Need 923 1820 2743
More spending 924 1825 2749
Table A2: Immigration Probits
Variable Less West Indian Less Asian Less Euro Less Australian
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Unemployment rate -0.679 -0.51 -1.611 -1.17 1.098 0.87 -0.564 -0.43
Ethnic minor. conc. 0.007 0.32 0.036 1.46 0.012 0.54 0.019 0.83
Income Rank 0.251 2.50 0.196 1.99 0.039 0.40 0.129 1.34
Manual worker 0.040 0.70 0.111 1.92 0.119 2.26 0.029 0.53
Ever unemployed -0.032 -0.43 0.000 0.00 -0.013 -0.19 0.030 0.44
Ever long term unemp. 0.051 0.40 -0.055 -0.42 0.021 0.18 -0.144 -1.25
Female -0.008 -0.16 -0.014 -0.27 0.047 0.97 0.015 0.30
Compulsory Education 0.098 1.68 0.168 2.81 0.101 1.85 0.013 0.24
High Education Level -0.422 -5.10 -0.487 -5.75 -0.328 -3.97 -0.298 -3.40
Age 1.637 2.28 0.911 1.24 3.096 4.66 4.523 6.38
Age2 -0.733 -0.98 -0.319 -0.42 -2.693 -3.97 -5.125 -7.05
Catholic -0.180 -2.32 -0.225 -2.70 -0.060 -0.77 -0.075 -0.94
No religion 0.023 0.43 -0.029 -0.52 0.036 0.72 0.072 1.39
Sample size 4624 4650 4638 4644
39Table A3: Racial Attitude Probits
Variable Marriage Boss Prejudice
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Unemployment rate 2.249 1.71 -0.256 -0.18 -0.680 -0.84
Ethnic minor. conc. 0.094 3.69 0.013 0.44 0.079 4.61
Income Rank 0.296 2.68 -0.021 -0.17 0.386 5.44
Manual worker 0.075 1.43 -0.035 -0.58 -0.091 -2.43
Ever unemployed -0.007 -0.10 0.016 0.21 0.082 1.52
Ever long term unemp. -0.006 -0.04 0.125 0.89 -0.081 -0.94
Female 0.060 1.21 -0.128 -2.24 -0.202 -5.99
Compulsory Education 0.109 1.88 0.152 2.31 0.051 1.23
High Education Level -0.314 -3.44 -0.155 -1.36 -0.322 -5.36
Age/100 4.067 5.81 -1.783 -2.33 0.534 1.15
Age2/10000 -2.848 -4.02 2.217 2.85 -0.564 -1.19
Catholic -0.095 -1.21 -0.239 -2.29 -0.326 -5.50
No religion -0.087 -1.53 0.049 0.80 0.001 0.02
Sample size 4143 4184 10049
Table A4: Job Attitudes Probits
Variable Job Loss Find Job Wage Job Security
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Unemployment rate 0.127 0.11 15.056 4.06 2.810 3.03 -2.757 -0.69
Ethnic minor. conc. -0.013 -0.56 -0.091 -1.78 -0.050 -2.47 0.024 0.43
Income Rank -1.596 -15.22 -0.625 -2.89 -0.802 -8.67 -0.652 -2.47
Manual worker 0.004 0.07 0.172 1.52 0.258 5.04 0.239 1.89
Ever unemployed 0.021 0.30 0.166 1.03 0.001 0.01 1.054 6.66
Ever long term unemp. 0.041 0.29 0.202 0.75 0.105 1.15 0.572 2.68
Female 0.342 6.53 -0.143 -1.39 0.332 6.97 -0.076 -0.66
Compulsory Education -0.045 -0.82 -0.075 -0.64 0.086 1.66 0.035 0.27
High Education Level 0.114 1.68 0.051 0.30 0.055 0.88 0.081 0.44
Age/100 -8.743 -9.00 3.494 1.79 2.015 2.66 1.878 0.65
Age2/10000 12.325 10.82 -0.924 -0.43 -1.447 -1.57 -0.568 -0.16
Catholic -0.043 -0.51 -0.065 -0.38 0.035 0.55 -0.071 -0.39
No religion -0.071 -1.43 0.078 0.75 0.038 0.84 0.028 0.23
Sample size 9045 651 5566 589
40Table A5: Welfare Attitude Probits
Variable Bene¯ts Need More Spending
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Unemployment rate -6.966 -7.29 -8.028 -5.99 -3.380 -2.43
Ethnic minor. conc. 0.014 0.76 0.055 2.08 -0.020 -0.77
Income Rank 0.461 5.06 0.169 1.51 0.615 5.64
Manual worker -0.147 -3.37 0.071 1.14 -0.133 -2.29
Ever unemployed -0.212 -3.24 -0.059 -0.67 -0.016 -0.17
Ever long term unemp. -0.188 -1.47 -0.132 -1.09 -0.087 -0.67
Female 0.054 1.16 0.069 1.28 0.085 1.61
Compulsory Education 0.037 0.80 0.247 3.51 0.127 1.98
High Education Level -0.416 -6.26 -0.387 -3.82 -0.133 -1.47
Age/100 -0.935 -1.84 0.483 0.59 -1.641 -2.01
Age2/10000 2.052 4.00 0.652 0.76 1.141 1.37
Catholic -0.237 -3.61 -0.087 -1.10 -0.306 -3.60
No religion -0.148 -3.39 -0.050 -0.86 -0.120 -2.06
Sample size 10282 2740 2746
41Appendix C Minimum distance estimates of M and
§
Table A6: MD estimates of M and §v, all respondents
M
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§w)
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
Marriage 0.763 17.27 { { { { 0.418
Boss 0.841 16.49 { { { { 0.292
Prejudice 0.780 18.71 { { { { 0.391
Job Loss { { 0.472 5.79 { { 0.778
Find Job { { 0.377 5.04 { { 0.858
Wage { { 0.139 2.01 { { 0.981
Job security { { 0.773 6.73 { { 0.402
Bene¯ts { { { { 0.678 14.82 0.541
Need { { { { 0.722 16.06 0.478
More Spending { { { { 0.497 12.86 0.753
§v
Variable Race Jobs Welfare
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio
Race 1.000 - 0.002 0.03 0.321 6.81
Jobs 0.002 0.03 1.000 - -0.284 -3.89
Welfare 0.321 6.81 -0.284 -3.89 1.000 -
Restrictions imposed: §22 = §w + M §v M0
Newey Â2
32 = 40.463 P-value = 0.145
The ¯gures in the last column of the uppermost table, headed diag(§w), indicate the pro-
portion of the residual variance for the response in question which is not attributable to the
relevant factor.
42Appendix D Wording of the Questions
Table B1: Immigration Questions
Response West Indians Indians Common Market Australians and
and Pakistanis Countries (Europe) New Zealanders
more settlement,
about the same 34.79 31.06 55.29 68.01
less settlement 65.21 68.94 44.71 31.99
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Wording of Question: Britain controls the number of people from abroad that are allowed to settle in this
country. Please say for each of the groups below whether you think Britain should allow more settlement,
less settlement, or about the same as now.
Table B 2: Racial Acceptability Questions
Opposition to Opposition to
Response Marriage Boss
Not mind 48.09 81.11
Mind 51.91 18.89
100.00 100.00
Wording of Question: Do you think most people in Britain would mind
(or not mind) if one of their close relatives were to marry a person of Asian
/ West Indian origin? ... and you personally? Would you mind or not mind?
Do you think most people in Britain would mind (or not mind) if a suitably
quali¯ed person of Asian / West Indian origin were appointed as their boss?
... and you personally? Would you mind or not mind?
Table B 3: Racial Prejudice
Response
Not prejudiced at all 63.73
Very or a little prejudiced 36.27
100.00
Wording of Question: How would you de-
scribe yourself? As very prejudiced against
people of other races, a little prejudiced, or
not prejudiced at all?




Wording of Question: If employed: Think-
ing now about your own job, how likely (or
unlikely) is it that you will leave this employer
over the next year for any reason? ... Why do
you think you will leave?
People recorded as likely are those who an-
swered very likely or quite likely to the ¯rst
question and gave as reason ¯rm will close
down, I will be declared redundant, or my con-
tract of employment will expire.







Wording of Question: If in paid job for 10
or more hours a week: If you lost your job for
any reason, and were looking actively for an-
other one, how easy, or di±cult, do you think
it would be for you to ¯nd an acceptable job?
If in paid job for less than 10 hours a week or
no paid job: If you were looking actively, how
easy, or di±cult, do you think it would be for
you to ¯nd an acceptable job?
Table B 6: Wage Expectations
rise by more than cost of living 16.86
rise by same as cost of living 48.15
rise by less than cost of living 26.60
not rise at all 8.39
100.00
Wording of Question: If employee: If you
stay in this job, would you expect your wages
or salary over the coming year to ...







Wording of Question: If in paid work for
10 or more hours a week, please tick one box
to show how much you agree or disagree that
[this statement] applies to your job: My job is
secure.
Table B 8: Level of Bene¯ts
too low or neither 65.97
too high 34.03
100.00
Wording of Question: Opinions di®er about
the level of bene¯ts for the unemployed.
Which of these ... statements comes closest
to your own: Bene¯ts for the unemployed are
too low and cause hardship or Bene¯ts for the
unemployed are too high and discourage people
from ¯nding jobs.
In later years, people are allowed to agree to
both - in all years we categorise according to
whether people accept only the second state-
ment.
44Table B 9: Attitudes to Welfare
Responses Need More spending




strongly disagree 5.93 1.73
100.00 100.00
Wording of Question: Please tick one box
for each statement below to show how much
you agree or disagree with it.
Many people who get social security do not re-
ally deserve any help.
The government should spend more money on
welfare bene¯ts for the poor, even if it leads to
higher taxes.
We reverse the answers to the ¯rst statement.
45Appendix E Equally weighted MDE
Table 9: MDE estimates of ¤, all respondents
Variable Race Jobs Welfare diag(§u)¤
Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe® t-ratio Coe®
West Indian 0.459 10.55 0.181 2.25 0.191 2.76 0.680
Asian 0.523 10.51 0.201 2.42 0.239 3.12 0.571
European 0.106 2.71 0.153 1.90 0.147 2.17 0.946
Aust.,N.Z -0.003 -0.08 0.133 1.66 0.092 1.36 0.981
Newey M1 Â2
32 = 40.109 P-value = 0.154
Newey M2 Â2
60 = 62.348 P-value = 0.393
Newey M3 Â2
203 = 31838.522 P-value = 0.000
Restrictions imposed: §22 = §w + M §v M0, §12 = ¤§v M0
Newey M1 is a test of §22 = §w + M §v M0
Newey M2 is a joint test of §22 = §w + M §v M0 and §12 = ¤§v M0
Newey M1 is a joint test of §22 = §w +M §v M0, §12 = ¤§v M0 and ¡ = B ( ¤ M )0
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